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- IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS --

AE CLEVITE, INC. and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners,

:
:

vs.

Case No.: 990218-CA

:
Labor Commission No.: 97-0538

LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH and
CHARLES TJAS,

Priority 7

Respondents.

JURISDICTION
This Petition for Review by Petitioners AE Cleavite, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. (hereinafter after referred to jointly as "AE Clevite") isfroman Order of the Labor
Commission, State of Utah, dated February 26, 1999. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801 (8) (a), 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1998).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether Mr. Tjas' slip and fall on January 13, 1997 while salting his home driveway
following a snow storm — which he had similarly done for more than thirty years — was
nevertheless an industrial accident which "arose out of and in the course of his employment with
AE Clevite.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court's review of the Labor Commission's Order is governed by the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), which provides relief if an agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law. Utah Code Ann. § 64-46b-16 (4) (d) (1998). This appeal
concerns the Labor Commission's application of the law to the particular facts of this case.
Therefore, this Court will review the matter under the intermediate standard of review,
looking for an abuse of discretion. Osman v. Industrial Commission. 958 P.2d 420, 424
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1) (1996).1
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and
the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of
and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, and such
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter.
This case presents an issue of first impression for the Utah courts — the application of
the Utah Workers Compensation Act to a "work at home" situation. The Labor Commission
found that there was no prior Utah case law or Labor Commission opinion which specifically
addressed this issue. AE Clevite has accordingly prepared a thorough review of basic
principles established in Utah case law, as well a survey of the case law from the other 49
states. A survey of state law is attached as Exhibit "A" in the Addendum.

^his code section was renumbered, effective July 1, 1997, as 34A-2-401.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings
This case concerns a dispute over the scope of activities which will be considered work
related in order for an accident to be found to have "arisen out of and in the course of
employment under the Utah Workers Compensation Act. Specifically, this case concerns an
issue of first impression, the application of the Utah Workers Compensation Act to a "work at
home" situation.
From 1987 to 1997, Mr. Tjas worked as a district sales manager for AE Clevite, with
an area covering Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Nevada. AE Clevite did not
maintain an office in Salt Lake City; rather, Mr. Tjas had a computer, a fax, and a printer in
his den which he used to perform paperwork one day a week. Generally, Mr. Tjas would
travel to visit clients Monday through Thursday. He typically performed office work in his
den on Friday. Mr. Tjas never met clients at his home, nor did he ever meet with
representatives of AE Clevite at his home. Rather, when business meetings were held, Mr.
Tjas would travel to a local hotel to meet with company representatives.
Mr. Tjas has lived in the same residence for more than 30 years. The driveway to Mr.
Tjas' personal residence is steep, and during the winter it sometimes becomes slippery due to
snow and ice. Mr. Tjas has worried for years about someone falling on his driveway, and thus
he had developed the practice of shoveling the snow and, thereafter, casting salt on the
driveway surface. On Monday, January 13, 1997, Mr. Tjas slipped and fell while salting his
driveway, suffering serious injuries.
-3-

Mr. Tjas' claim for workers compensation benefits was denied by AE Clevite on the
basis that his injuries did not "arise out of and in the course of his employment with AE
Clevite; rather, his injuries arose from a personal activity of salting the driveway of his
personal residence. Mr. Tjas filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor
Commission on June 27, 1997. AE Clevite filed an Answer on July 23, 1997, and the matter
was set for hearing. The parties waived their right to a formal hearing (primarily due to
logistic difficulties associated with Mr. Tjas' quadripelgia), submitting briefs based on
deposition testimony relative to the legal issues presented in this case. Administrative Law
Judge Barbara A. Elicerio entered an Order on July 22, 1998, granting Mr. Tjas' claim for
workers compensation benefits. A copy of this Order is attached as Exhibit "B" in the
Addendum.
AE Clevite filed a timely Motion for Review with the Labor Commission. The matter
was briefed by the parties, and the Labor Commission issued its order on February 26, 1999.
In reviewing this case, the Labor Commission recognized that it presented an issue of first
impression. The Commission further found that this case was factually difficult and presented
a close call to the line that divides compensable injuries from noncompensable injuries. The
Labor Commission nevertheless concluded that Mr. Tjas1 act of salting his personal driveway
was "incidental" to employment, and therefore awarded Mr. Tjas workers compensation
benefits for his injuries. A copy of the Labor Commission's Order is attached as Exhibit "C"
in the Addendum.
AE Clevite timely filed a Petition for Review with this Court on March 15, 1999, and
filed a docketing statement on April 1, 1999. Respondent Charles Tjas filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition on April 9, 1999, to which AE Clevite responded on April 22, 1999.
-4-

On April 26, 1999, this Court entered an Order denying and deferring Mr. Tjas' motion
following plenary presentation and consideration of this case.
Statement of Facts
The claimant, Charles Tjas, has resided at 2467 Emerson in Salt Lake City, Utah since
June, 1965. (R. at 276, p. 242.) At the time of his alleged industrial accident, Mr. Tjas was
working as a District Sales Manager for AE Clevite, an automotive engine supply company.
(R. at 276, pp. 16, 32-34.)
Mr. Tjas had worked in the same industry since 1977. His first employment in the
industry was with DAB Industries where he worked from 1977 to 1984. (R. at 276, p. 4.)
While at DAB Industries, Mr. Tjas was a District Sales Manager, covering the states of Utah,
Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Colorado and Nevada. Mr. Tjas presented customers
with catalogs and brochures of available items, along with the price list. (R. at 276, p. 6.)
Mr. Tjas traveled a great deal for DAB Industries. He was typically gone from Monday
morning through Thursday evening, with Friday being used as an "office day" to catch up on
paper work. (R. at 276, p. 7.) In performing his office work, Mr. Tjas had a den in his home
that contained a desk, a computer, a fax, and a printer. (R. at 276, p. 10.)
In 1984, Mr. Tjas shifted employment to General Battery for an increase in pay. Mr.
Tjas engaged in the same general routine in the same general geographical area as he had with

2

The Labor Commission's Record in this case consists of the pleadings (Volumes 1 and 2),
two deposition transcripts (Volume 3 is the deposition transcript of Mr. Tjas' supervisor, Vince
Tramontano, and Volume 4 is the deposition transcript of Mr. Tjas), and a video tape of Mr. Tjas'
deposition (Volume 5). Citations for the Statement of Facts in this brief come primarilyfromMr.
Tjas' deposition transcript, marked as page 276 of the Record.
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DAB Industries. Rather than selling engine parts, however, Mr. Tjas sold batteries. Mr. Tjas
worked for General Battery until 1987. (R. at 276, pp. 12, 15.)
In 1987, Mr. Tjas again shifted employment to AE Clevite, a company which had
purchased DAB Industries. In essence, Mr. Tjas returned to his former employer. (R. at 276,
p. 16.) At AE Clevite, Mr. Tjas again engaged in the routine of leaving Monday morning to
make calls on customers, returning home Thursday evening. Mr. Tjas was given a company
car which he kept at his home. (R. 276, pp. 18, 19.) His geographic area included Utah,
Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and parts of Nevada. (R. at 276, p. 20.) In making customer
calls, Mr. Tjas would take catalogs, brochures, and price lists. He also kept a set of engine
gaskets in the trunk of his car to show to customers. (R. at 276, p. 22.)
AE Clevite did not direct any of Mr. Tjas' activities at his home. (R. at 276, p. 23.)
Specifically, AE Clevite never directed Mr. Tjas to clear his sidewalks and driveway of snow
and ice. (R. at 276, p. 32.) Similarly, AE Clevite had never directed Mr. Tjas to perform
any type of general maintenance work on his home or in his yard. (R. at 276, p. 32.) Indeed,
from 1987 through 1997, Mr. Tjas never invited a customer to his home, nor did a customer
ever come to his home. (R. at 276, pp. 47-48.) Moreover, from 1987 through 1997, Mr.
Tjas never received a visit at home from anyone connected with his employment. Rather,
whenever his supervisor, Vince Tramontano, came to town, he always stayed at a hotel in Salt
Lake City, and Mr. Tjas would meet him at his hotel. (R. at 276, pp. 48-49; R. at 275, pp.
8-9.)
Mr. Tjas is a Utah native, born and raised in Bountiful, Utah. (R. at 276, p. 24.) As
a Utah native, Mr. Tjas is aware that snow is a common occurrence and must be cleared off of
the driveway and sidewalks. Mr. Tjas used a snow shovel rather than a snow blower to clear
-6-

his sidewalks and driveway. He estimates that he shoveled snow about ten times each winter.
(R. at 276, p. 25.) Mr. Tjas was aware that a city ordinance required all homeowners to clear
snow and ice from their sidewalks and driveways. (R. at 276, p. 30.) He shared the duty of
clearing the snow and ice from the driveway with his son. (R. at 276, pp. 24, 31.)
i

Mr. Tjas' driveway is very steep as it approaches the road. Because of the steep pitch
of the driveway, Mr. Tjas habitually used salt on the driveway. (R. at 276, p. 26.) Despite
this use of salt, over the years cars nevertheless became stuck "a couple of times" on Mr. Tjas'
steep driveway. (R. at 276, p. 27.) Mr. Tjas himself had previously slipped on his driveway
"a few times." (R. at 276, p. 29.) Because of the steepness of the driveway, Mr. Tjas
testified that "for years I've worried about that driveway and someone falling on it." (R. at
276, p. 58.)
Mr. Tjas was injured on January 13, 1997. He awoke that Monday morning to find six
to seven inches of snow on his driveway. (R. at 276, p. 34.) Mr. Tjas did not shovel any
snow that morning; rather, he left in his car about 8:00 to call on some accounts around town.
(R. at 276, pp. 32-34.) Mr. Tjas1 36-year old son, Jeff, shoveled the driveway and walks
while Mr. Tjas was at work. (R. at 276, p. 35.)
Mr. Tjas returned home from work between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. (R. at 276, p. 33.)
Mr. Tjas changed out of his business clothes, putting on some casual rubber-soled shoes. (R.
at 276, pp. 41, 60.) Because he was planning to leave on a trip to Montana in two days
(January 15, 1997), Mr. Tjas spent about an hour organizing items in the trunk of his car.
Mr. Tjas estimates that he made about ten trips to his car. (R. at 276, pp. 37-38.) Mr. Tjas
suffered no injury while loading his car or organizing his materials. After Mr. Tjas had
completed loading his car, he returned without incident to his house. (R. at 276, p. 39.)
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Mr. Tjas was expecting to receive a package from Arizona prior to his scheduled trip to
Montana in two days. (R. at 276, pp. 50-51.) The package could have been sent by UPS,
Federal Express, or US Mail. (R. at 276, p. 50.) Mr. Tjas had no idea how the package in
question had been sent, (R. at 276, p. 50), nor did he know exactly when it would arrive. (R.
at 276, p. 58.) He did know that the package would be bulky and awkward. (R. at 276, p.
58.).
While standing inside his kitchen, Mr. Tjas happened to observe through his window
the mail carrier coming up the street. Mr. Tjas lives on a dead-end street, and the mail carrier
must deliver the mail to Mr. Tjas at a mailbox attached to the home next to Mr. Tjas' front
door. (R. at 276, pp. 28, 39, 42.) Mr. Tjas returned outside, picked up a nearly empty 50pound bag of salt, and began his routine of salting the driveway. (R. at 276, pp. 39-40.) It
made no difference to Mr. Tjas whether he received a business package or not - his intent was
to make the driveway safer for the mail carrier. According to Mr. Tjas:
Q: [by attorney Atkin] You were saying that the company used Fed Ex,
UPS and regular mail?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you remember why you thought the mailman had that package
that particular day?
A: I didn't know for sure that he did.
Q: Uh-huh.
A: But in case he did, I wanted to make sure that he didn't get hurt.
Q: And why did the package make any difference, I assume you
wouldn't want him to get hurt even if he was carrying your regular mail.
A: Well, I would have thrown the salt anyway. Well, the box is quite
-8-

awkward and I knew that if he had it - you know I've always been
afraid of that driveway.
(R. at 276, p. 58.)
Mr. Tjas began to broadcast the salt onto his driveway with his hand. The driveway
did not appear to be slippery to Mr. Tjas. However, when he reached the steep part of his
driveway, he slipped and fell backwards, suffering his catastrophic injury. (R. at 276, pp. 4042.) He was taken by ambulance to the hospital. (R. at 276, p. 43.) Mr. Tjas has been
diagnosed as suffering from C3-4 quadriplegia. Mr. Tjas did not receive his anticipated
package on January 13, 1997, from any source. Rather, a package arrived for him the next
day. (R. at 276, p. at 64.)
Following his injury, Mr. Tjas received salary continuation benefits and short-term
disability benefits through July 15, 1997. (R. at 75.) On May 29, 1997, Mr. Tjas applied for
long-term disability benefits through his employer. In his application for LTD benefits, Mr.
Tjas specifically affirmed that his injury was not work-related, and he did not intend to file a
workers compensation claim. (R. at 70.)
Nevertheless, on June 27, 1997, Mr. Tjas filed a claim for workers compensation
benefits with the Labor Commission of Utah. The claim was denied by AE Clevite on the
i

basis that it did not "arise out of and in the course of Mr. Tjas* employment with AE Clevite.
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SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Utah Law Requires That An Accident Arise Out Of And In The Course Of
Employment.

The Labor Commission erred in concluding that salting the driveway of a personal
residence is a work-related activity which may be the basis for an award of workers
compensation benefits. Under Utah law, a claimant must prove that he suffered an accident
"arising out of and "in the course" of his employment. Each element is unique, and both must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
The present case presents an issue of first impression for the Utah courts — the
application of the Utah Workers Compensation Act to an employee who regularly performs
part of his work at his home. The Labor Commission's conclusion that the activity of salting
the driveway of an employee's personal residence is "reasonably incidental" to work is an
abuse of discretion and an unreasonably broad interpretation and application of the Act's
requirements that an accident "arise out of and "in the course of employment. The
Commission's decision so broadens the definition of compensable activities that any activity,
with only a tangential work relationship and benefit to the employer, may now be considered
work-related.
The Labor Commission's reliance upon the phrase "reasonably incidental" to
employment is a misapplication of traditional principles of workers compensation law.
Historically, the scope of compensable activities has been defined primarily by the employer's
work premises. The employer-controlled premises has provided a physical boundary for
defining work-related activities, and injuries which have occurred on the employer's premises
-10-

have essentially been presumed to have "arisen out of and "in the course" of employment. For
example, under the "personal comfort" doctrine, personal activities such as eating, drinking,
using the restroom, and seeking fresh air have been categorized as "incidental" to employment.
Only when the injury on the employer's premises was shown to have arisen from a personal
risk or significant deviation has compensation been denied.
In contrast, once an employee leaves the employer's premises, there has been a
presumption that the employee's activities are not in the course of employment, unless the
facts reveal a clear work-relationship. For example, although arguably "incidental" to
employment, travel to and from work is generally considered outside of the course of
employment. The courts have reasoned that the risks of travel are personal risks which do
not originate with the employment. However, the risks of travel may be transferred to the
employer under a variety of circumstances, i.e., the employer requires the travel as a part of
the work, or the travel for the employer is a "special mission" for the employer.
The Utah courts have similarly used the "dual purpose" doctrine to evaluate an activity
which serves concurrent business and personal objectives while away from the employer's
premises. If it is shown that the activity is required by the business purpose, in the absence of
a personal purpose, or that the business purpose predominates, the activity will be found to be
in the course of employment.
2.

Mr. Tjasf Injury Did Not Arise Out Of And In The Course Of His
Employment With AE Clevite.

Using these basic principles to evaluate Mr. Tjas' claim, it becomes clear that injuries
suffered while salting the driveway of a personal residence may not be considered to have
-11-

"arisen out of and "in the course of employment. The risk of injury at Mr. Tjas' home was
primarily personal. The use of his home as a place to perform paperwork for his employer did
not transfer the risk of injury from any and all activities Mr. Tjas engaged in at his home to
AE Clevite. Mr. Tjas never invited clients to his home and never met with company
representatives at his home. Further, Mr. Tjas was neither required nor requested by AE
Clevite to perform any regular maintenance of his residence. The duty to salt the driveway
was a personal duty Mr. Tjas had undertaken for the last 30 years for purely personal reasons.
He had shared the maintenance duties with his son, who had shoveled the snow from the
driveway on the morning of the accident. The duty to perform paperwork in the den at his
home cannot reasonably be expanded to include salting the driveway.
Professor Larson has observed that injuries which occur at a home work site may be
compensable if they occur while the employee is engaged in the actual performance of the
work. The risk of injury is placed upon the employer based upon the fact that the risk at the
home is encountered while actually performing the duties required by the employer.
Otherwise, employers would be subject to providing 24-hour coverage and assuming all of the
risks now considered personal and unrelated to business at an employee's personal residence.
The legal standard proposed by Professor Larson and AE Clevite is consistent with
prior Utah cases in which liability was imposed upon an employer for injuries which
employees suffered while engaged in activities away from the employer's premises. In all of
these cases, the courts have identified a direct work relationship upon which the transfer of
risk may be based. In the present case, the facts to not support a transfer of risk to the
employer because the work-relationship is, if anything, only minor and "incidental."
Accordingly, Mr. Tjas' injuries should not be considered to have occurred "in the course of
-12-

his employment with AE Clevite.
The facts of this case also fail to support the conclusion that Mr. Tjas' injuries "arose
out of" his employment. To "arise out of" employment, the event must arise from a condition
of employment. In the present case, Mr. Tjas undertook the duty to salt his driveway for
personal reasons unrelated to the work that he performed for AE Clevite at his home. The
possible receipt of a work-related package with his personal mail is insufficient to transform
the nature of this activity.

3.

Majority Case Law In The United States Supports AE Clevite's Position
That Mr. Tjas1 Injury Did Not Arise Out Of And In The Course of His
Employment.

A survey of case law from other jurisdictions supports AE Clevite's argument that the
Labor Commission's order is an aberration and abuse of discretion. In preparation of this
brief, counsel for AE Clevite have researched the statutory provisions and case law for all of
the 50 states. A summary of this research has been prepared and is attached in the Addendum.
This summary reveals that, while only a few states have addressed the issue of compensability
for an injury which occurs at the employee's home, the overriding principles adopted in the
great majority of the states do not support the Labor Commission's interpretation that salting a
home driveway is an activity which "arises out of" and "in the course of" employment.
Moreover, in those states where a similar issue has been presented, the courts have required a
much greater work relationship than that shown under the present facts.
This Court should find that the Labor Commission abused its discretion in concluding
that Mr. Tjas' activity of salting his home drive was "reasonably incidental" to his employment
with AE Clevite. The Court should require that, when an injury occurs at a home work site,
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the employee must demonstrate that the injury occurred during the actual performance of the
work. An "incidental" work relationship should be rejected as an insufficient basis upon
which liability for personal risks may be foisted upon the employer. The Court should reverse
the Labor Commission's order and find Mr. Tjas' claim non-compensable on the basis that his
injuries did not "arise out of and in the course of" his employment with AE Clevite.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE LABOR COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT SALTING THE
DRIVEWAY OF A PERSONAL RESIDENCE IS A WORK-RELATED
ACTIVITY IS AN UNREASONABLY BROAD APPLICATION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT.

To qualify for workers' compensation benefits in Utah, an employee must suffer an
injury by accident "arising out of and in the course of" the employment. Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-041 (1998) (emphasis supplied).3 Both elements must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence. Buczvnski v. Industrial Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
Under Utah law, "an injury occurs 'in the course of employment when it takes place
(1) within the period of employment, (2) at a place where the employee reasonably may be in
the performance of her duties, and (3) while she is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing
something incidental thereto." Walls v. Industrial Comm'n. 857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (citing 82 Am Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation § 266 (1992) and 1 A. Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law § 14.00 (1993) ("The course of employment requirement. . .

3

At the time of Petitioner's claimed accident, this provision was found at § 35-1- 45

(1996).
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demands that the injury be shown to have arisen within the time and space boundaries of the
employment and in the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment.")).
"Moreover, all three criteria of time, place and circumstances must be fulfilled in order for a
claimant to recover workers compensation benefits." IcL An accident "arises out of"
employment "when there is a 'causal relationship' between the injury and the employment."
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n. 888 P.2d 707, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert,
denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
While recognizing the principle of "liberal construction" for the Workers Compensation
Act, this Court has declared that the scope of activities covered by the Act is not without
limits. In Walls, this court declared: "the words, 'in the course of,' . . . cannot be liberalized
by judicial interpretation for the purpose of allowing compensation on every claim asserted,
thereby rendering such words meaningless." 857 P.2d at 970 (quoting Emmel v. State
Compensation Director. 145 S.E.2d 29, 33 (W. Va. 1965)).
The concern of the court in Walls is particularly acute when examining the scope of
activities for those employees who are not held to the traditional boundaries of employment as
to when and where they perform their work. In Martinson v. Industrial Commission, 606
P.2d 256 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court noted the following:
To maintain actuarial soundness and integrity of workmen's
compensation systems, it is essential that premiums be collected
to cover the risks involved. The coverage does not, and as a
practical matter, cannot extend to any injury done to an employee
where and whenever it happens, but is limited to accidental
injuries which occur in the course of and arise out of the
performance of his duties. A special problem exists in some
occupations such as salesmen, where there is elasticity both as to
the place and hours of such performance; and wherein it is
comparatively easy for an employee who may suffer an injury at
practically any time or place to contrive a report of being
-15-

involved in business in order to bring himself under coverage.
Id, at 257.
The governing principle in defining the scope of work-related injuries is that there be a
"sufficient nexus with [thel employment to be said to be within the course of such
employment." Walls. 857 P.2d at 969. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Labor Commission recognized that this case presented an issue of first impression the application of the Utah Workers Compensation Act to a "work at home" situation. (R. at
267.) The parties accordingly referred to case law from other jurisdictions to argue their
respective positions. The Commission found, however, that these cases involved factual
situations which were "substantially different" from the present claim, and thereby concluded
that "no specific rule can be extracted from such cases that can properly be applied to Mr.
Tjas's circumstances." (R. at 267.)
The Commission concluded that it would return "to the fundamental principles of Utah
workers' compensation law, as described by Utah's appellate courts." (R. at 267.) The
Commission quoted the definition of "in the course" of employment supplied in the case of M
& K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948), which states as follows:
"an accident occurs 'in the course' of employment when it 'occurs while the employee is
rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something incidental
thereto, at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render such service.'" (R.
at 267, emphasis in the Commission's Order.) The Commission found that since Mr. Tjas
received work-related mail at his home (along with his personal mail), his "efforts to make his
driveway safe for the delivery of mail was reasonably incidental to the performance of
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Clevite's work," and therefore a compensable workers compensation activity. (R. at 267,
emphasis supplied.)
The Labor Commission's conclusion that the activity of salting the driveway of an
employee's home is "reasonably incidental" to his work is an abuse of discretion and an
unreasonably broad interpretation and application of the Act's requirements that an accident
"arise out of and in the course of" employment. The Commission's decision so broadens the
scope of activities which will be considered work-related that any accident with only a
tangential relationship to work will be now be found to be compensable under the Workers
Compensation Act.
A.

The Labor Commission Misinterpreted Traditional Principles of Workers
Compensation Law,
1.

Injuries occurring on an employer's premises are presumed to be in
the course of employment.

The language relied upon by the Commission was quoted from M & K Corp. v.
Industrial Commission. 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948). In M & K. the decedent,
William Harries, was the general superintendent in charge of a building project at Utah State
University. Mr. Harries had taken a ten-wheeled truck owned by M & K from Logan to Salt
Lake City to obtain roofing materials. On his return trip to Logan, Mr. Harries allowed his 14
year-old son to drive the truck as they traveled through Sardine Canyon. The truck overturned
in an accident, and Mr. Harries was killed. Mr. Harries' son was not an employee of M & K,
and was not old enough to drive legally. The employer conceded that the time, place, and
activity in which Mr. Harries was engaged were clearly work-related. kL at 134. The central
issue which the court reviewed in M & K was whether Mr. Harries had deviated from the
-17-

course of his employment in allowing his son to drive the truck.4 Consequently, although the
court's opinion in M & K includes the phrase "incidental to employment" as a part of its
definition of "in the course" of employment, this language is dicta and was not defined by the
court.
Subsequently, however, in Kennecott Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 675 P.2d
1187 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court defined the term "incidental" as follows:

A class of activities widely recognized as "incidental" to
employment are those acts engaged in by the employee to
minister to his personal comfort. Such acts ordinarily include
satisfying thirst or hunger, seeking fresh air, using the restroom,
making telephone calls, and the like. An employee does not
leave the course of employment by engaging in such acts unless
the extent of the departure is so great that an intent to abandon
the job temporarily may be inferred, or unless the method chosen
is so unusual or unreasonable that the conduct cannot be
considered an incident of employment.

675 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1983) (citing 1A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation § 21.00 (1982)) (emphasis supplied).
The court explained that certain activities are considered "incidental" to employment as
a part of the "personal comfort doctrine," a doctrine which has been widely adopted in most
jurisdictions. "[T]he personal comfort rule recognizes the realities of the work place and the
necessity of workers to exercise personal discretion in caring for their reasonable needs while

4

Buczinkski v. Industrial Commission, 934 P.2d 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cites the
same language from M & K . Again, it is notable that the issue in Buczinski was whether the
accident had occurred while the claimant was on a personal deviation from the business trip.
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working." IcL at 1191. Central to the personal comfort doctrine is the fact that the employee's
injury occurs while on an employer controlled premises.
In Kennecott, the employee died as a result of drowning in a settling pond on the
employers' premises while on a lunch break. The court explained that "injuries occurring on
the premises during a regular lunch hour arise in the course of employment." IcL (quoting
1A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 21.21 (a) (1982) (emphasis in
original)); accord Askren v. Industrial Comm'n. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964) (fall during the
lunch hour in a cafeteria maintained on the company premises was compensable).
Thus, to the extent that an employee is actually on the employer's premises, there is a
rebuttable presumption that his or her activities are work-related. This presumption may be
challenged, for example, by facts that demonstrate that the injury arose from a significant
personal deviation from employment, i.e., horseplay. See, e.g.. Prows v. Industrial Comm'n,
610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980). Even injuries which occur on the employer's premises while the
employee is traveling to and from work are considered to be "in the course of" employment
under the "premises rule." Solider Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah
1985) (citing 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 15.11 (1985)).
The employer's property line thus provides a "bright line test. . . based upon the logic
that while the employee is on the employer's premises, his connection with the employment is
both 'physical and tangible.'" IcL at 1167. Professor Larson has explained:

the "premises" limitation is to some extent arbitrary and artificial,
but, since some limitation is unavoidable, it is perhaps as good as
any that can be devised. It can be defended in part on a sort of
presumption that as long as the employee is on the premises he
or she is subject to all the environmental hazards associated with
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the employment, and . . . he or she is in some degree subject to
the control of the employer . . . .

1 A. Larson, Larson's Workers Compensation. Desk Edition, § 21.21(a) (1998) (emphasis
supplied).
The policy underlying this presumption is further understood when viewed in light of
the benefit which the employer receives by eliminating potential liability for tort claims.
Employees who receive workers compensation coverage for accidents sustained on the
employer's premises are precluded from bringing a civil suit against their employer as the
owner of the property. See, e ^ , Hope v. Berrett. 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).5
This result is consistent with the traditional purpose of the workers compensation system - - the
exchange of common law tort actions for a simplified system of no-fault insurance which is
defined and governed by a comprehensive statutory scheme.

2.

Injuries occurring away from the employer's premises are presumed
not to be in the course of employment, unless there is a clear
demonstration of a work relationship.

Traditionally, once an employee has left the employer's premises, his or her activities
are presumed not to be "in the course of" employment unless the facts demonstrate a clear
work-relationship. For example, the "going and coming" rule provides that "injuries suffered
while going to or from work are not within the course of employment and thus not

5

In Hope, the claimant was struck by the car of the defendant, a co-employee, while in the
employer's parking lot. The claimant received workers compensation benefits for her injuries, and
brought a personal injury suit against the co-worker. This court concluded that the claimant's suit
against the co-worker was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Utah Workers
Compensation Act.
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compensable under workers compensation laws." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177
(Utah 1997). The "going and coming" rule is universally accepted despite the assertion that
"in the very broadest sense . . . an injury which happens to a man who is on his way to his
place of employment is an injury ' growing out of and incidental to his employment,1 since a
necessary part of the employment is that the employee shall go to and return from his place of
labor." Wilson v. Industrial Comm'n. 207 P.2d 1116, 1117 (Utah 1949) (quoting Chandler v.
Industrial Comm'n. 208 P. 499, 500 (Utah 1922)) (emphasis suplied).
In Drake, the Supreme Court explained that the "going and coming " rule "arose
because 'in most instances, such an injury [while traveling to and from work] is suffered as a
consequence of risks and hazards to which all members of the traveling public are subject
rather than risks and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business
of the employer.'" WL at 182 (citing 82 Am. Jur.2d Workers Compensation § 296 (1992))
(emphasis supplied).
The "going and coming" rule is subject to several exceptions, all of which rely upon a
showing by the claimant that there is a substantial work relationship which shifts the risks of
travel to the employer. See, e j ^ , State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n. 685 P.2d 1051
(Utah 1984) (special mission exception); Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Comm'n, 663
P.2d 88 (Utah 1983) (dual purpose trip where the business part predominated); Kinne v.
Industrial Comm'n. 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) (transportation furnished by employer); Bailey
v. Industrial Comm'n. 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965) (employee required to use a vehicle as an
instrumentality of the business); Bountiful Brick v. Industrial Comm'n. 251 P. 148 (Utah
1926) (ingress and egress at place of employment are inherently dangerous). "Therefore, the
major focus in determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a given case is on
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the benefit the employer receives and his control over the conduct." Whitehead v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.. 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989) (emphasis supplied.)
In VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission. 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the
employee was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a company truck from his
home to the office. The employee argued that the "going and coming" rule was inapplicable
because his employer received a substantial benefit from his use of the truck. This court
disagreed, finding that the only benefit the employer received was the mere arrival of the
employee at work, and this alone could not be considered a substantial benefit to the employer
Accord Cross v. Industrial Comm'n. 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (an employee's
travel of long distances to and from temporary construction sites is not a substantial benefit to
the employer, nor is the mere carrying of work implements in the vehicle sufficient);
Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber. 465 P.2d 175 (Utah 1970) (travel to work earlier than normal
for a special meeting not essential to employment). Thus, in order to overcome the
presumption that travel is not work-related, the employee must show a substantial, not merely
incidental, benefit to the employer.
Similarly, the "dual purpose" rule has been used to analyze situations where employees
have suffered injuries away from the employer's premises. See Martinson v. Industrial
Commission. 606 P.2d 256, 258 n. 4 (Utah 1980). Professor Larson has summarized the
"dual purpose" rule as follows:
when a trip serves both business and personal purposes, it is a
personal trip if the trip would have been made in spite of the
failure or absence of the business purpose and would have been
dropped in the event of failure of the private purpose, though the
business errand remained undone; it is a business trip if a trip of
this kind would have been made in spite of the failure or absence
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of the private purpose, because the service to be performed for
the employer would have caused the journey to be made by
someone even if it had not coincided with the employee's
personal journey.

1 A. Larson, Larson's Workers Compensation. Desk Edition, § 18.12 (1998).
Alternatively, the Utah appellate courts have looked to "the paramount or predominant
motivation and purpose of the trip or other activity" to determine whether, on balance, the
accident occurred "in the course of" employment. See Martinson. 606 P.2d at 258; accord
Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Comm'n. 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983). In Martinson, the
court explained:

if the predominant motivation and purpose of the activity is in
serving the social aspect, or other personal diversion of the
employee, even though there may be some transaction of
business or performance of duty merely incidental or
adjunctive thereto, the person should not be deemed to be in
the course of his employment.

Id. (emphasis supplied).
The court in Martinson rejected the claimant's argument that his injuries from an
automobile collision, on his return from what he described as a combined business-pleasure
trip to Park City, were work-related. The court affirmed the denial of benefits based upon
facts which demonstrated that the employer neither directed nor required the claimant to go
to Park City on business. Id. The predominant purpose of the trip was found to be
personal, and thus non-compensable, notwithstanding the claimant's testimony that he had
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actually performed some business in Park City.6 JkL The court observed that with
employees who do not have a set place and/or time to perform their work, it is important to
review carefully the circumstances of the accident to ensure against abuse and an overly broad
application of the Workers Compensation Act. Id.
Recreational activities may also have an "incidental" benefit to the employer. Black v.
McDonald's of Lavton. 733 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). Again, however, time and place are
decisive elements in determining compensability, and if recreational activities are scheduled
during working hours on an employees premises, they are usually found to be work-related.
Id. at 156. However, if games are undertaken away from the employer's premises, and after
hours, the injured employee must produce evidence of a strong work connection through (1) a
degree of employer initiative, promotion, and sponsorship reflecting sufficient control to
identify the activity with the employment, (2) financial support and equipment furnished by the
employer; and/or (3) employer benefit. Notably, negligible financial support or benefit to the
employer, i.e., in the form of improved morale and enhanced camaraderie among employees,
is not sufficient. IcL at 157.
The broadest coverage that is granted to employees who are injured while away from
an employer's premises is found with the "travelling employees rule," also known as the
"continuous coverage" rule or "commercial traveler" rule. See Buczinski v. Industrial
Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This rule provides:

6

In contrast, in Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Commission, 663 P.2d 88 (Utah
1983), the court found substantial evidence that the predominant purpose of the decedent's
attendance at the Governor's Ball was for business. Specifically, the evidence showed the
decedent had planned on deducting the cost of attending the event (i.e., renting evening clothes)
as a business expense, had planned on discussing business matters with his host and other invitees,
and had accepted the invitation despite a scheduling conflict with out-of-town houseguests.
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Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer's
premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be within the
course of their employment continuously during the trip, except
when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown. Thus,
injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels and
eating in restaurants away from home are usually compensable.
Id. at 1173 (quoting 1A Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation § 35.00 (1996)) (emphasis supplied).
The rationale for this rule was quoted by this Court to be:
When the travel is essentially part of the employment, the risk [of
injury during activities necessitated by travel] remains an
incident to employment even though the employee may not
actually be working at the time of the injury.
Id. at 1174 (quoting omitted) (emphasis supplied by this Court in the Buczinski opinion). The
court found this rationale consistent with Utah case law in analogous situations. Specifically,
the court compared it to the "dual purpose "rule adopted in Martinson, and the proposition that
if the primary and predominant purpose of the trip is business, then incidental activities will
be covered. IcL Conversely, if the primary or predominant purpose of the trip is personal,
then a mere incidental business relationship will be insufficient for the injury to be
considered to have arisen "in the course of" employment. Martinson. 606 P.2d at 258.
These rules have established a framework in which risks may be assessed and defined
and premiums appropriately collected to cover the risks involved. The standard that can be
derived from this overview of basic workers compensation rules and principles can be
summarized as follows:
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It is fundamental that even though the employee may not be at a
regular place of work, he must be performing a duty for his
employer, or one which is so connected with his employment
as to be an essential part thereof, so that the mandate of the
statute is met that there must be an "accident arising out of or in
the course of employment."

Lundberg, 465 P.2d at 176 (emphasis supplied).

B.

Applying These Traditional Principles Of Workers Compensation Law, Mr.
Tjas5 Injury While Salting His Home Driveway Did Not Arise "In The
Course Of? His Employment With AE Clevite.

The difficulty in the present case lies in the fact that Mr. Tjas was injured at his home,
which also serves, in part, as a work site. However, as the Labor Commission recognized, the
agreement to have Mr. Tjas perform part of his work at home did not "transform every part of
his home into a work premise, nor was every activity undertaken by Mr. Tjas in his home
work-related." (R. at 267.) Although Mr. Tjas' home could be considered a "work
premises," AE Clevite had no control over this premises or the risks associated with it. Mr.
Tjas was neither required nor requested by AE Clevite to perform any regular maintenance of
his residence. No clients were ever invited to Mr. Tjas' home. Mr. Tjas never met with a
company representative at his home. Rather, Mr. Tjas' home was solely used as a place for
him to perform paper work. The performance of paper work in a den at Mr. Tjas' home did
not inherently require the maintenance of the Mr. Tjas' entire home, yard, driveway, or other
personal areas.
Since the traditional element of an employer controlled premises is absent, the
principles of the "personal comfort" rule and the "premise rule" would not apply. Instead,
since the home presents a myriad of personal risks and hazards to which all homeowners are
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subject, rather than risks related to or originating in the work or business of the employer, the
situation is more analogous to claims governed by the "going and coming" rule or the "dual
purpose" rule.
Using the principles of the "going and coming" rule, an injury suffered by an employee
while working at home would be presumed not to be in the course of his employment unless he
or she showed a clear work-relationship. In the case at bar, this requirement might be met, for
example, if Mr. Tjas developed carpal tunnel syndrome while preparing written reports for the
employer, or suffered a slip and fall injury while loading the company car with business
materials. In contrast, it would not be met by a slip and fall while mopping the kitchen floor
or fixing something on his roof. It would similarly not be met by Mr. Tjas' activity of salting
his personal driveway.
The same result occurs when applying the principles of the "dual purpose" rule to a
work-at-home situation. An employee working at home would be required to demonstrate that
the activity in which he or she was engaged at the time of the claimed accident was required by
work in the absence of a concurrent personal motivation. Ct_ Martinson, 663 P.2d at 258.
Alternatively, the worker could demonstrate that the activity was undertaken with the
"predominant motivation and purpose" of serving the employer, in contrast with the employer
receiving a merely incidental benefit from an activity which was predominantly motivated and
performed for personal reasons. CL M^ at 258. In the present case, Mr. Tjas would have to
show that he salted the driveway with the predominant motivation of serving AE Clevite.
However, Mr. Tjas has candidly admitted that he would have salted the driveway even if he
wasn't expecting a work-related package - as evidenced by the fact that he had cleared and
salted his driveway for thirty years for non-work-related reasons.
-27-

In evaluating injuries which occur at home, Professor Larson has observed that "|e|ven
when the service performed at home is casual or relatively unimportant, an injury occurring in
the actual performance of it is in the course of employment." 1A Arthur Larson & Lex K.
Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation, Desk Edition, § 18.34 (1998) (emphasis supplied).
As an example, Professor Larson cites to Georgia and New Jersey cases in which a police
officer was injured while cleaning his gun at home — a requirement of his work. This
conclusion is rational and reasonable since the risk of injury — the gun ~ directly originates
from the work, and the employee is thus clearly engaged in a work-related activity.
Professor Larson has further observed that even if the cause of the injury has its origins
in a personal risk rather than the work, i.e., the condition of the home, as long as the hazard is
"encountered in connection with the performance of the work" the claim should be
compensable. Id. (emphasis supplied). The key element which shifts the risk of injury from
the employee to the employer is the employee's clear engagement in a work activity.
Otherwise, employers would be subject to providing 24-hour coverage to an employee facing
normal, personal risks associated with home ownership and personal life.
In the present case, Mr. Tjas was injured while salting his personal driveway. He
admits he would have salted his driveway even if he had not been expecting a work-related
package. He had performed this same task for more than 30 years for personal reasons; thus,
his primary motivation and purpose in salting the driveway was to perform his duty as a home
owner and to protect himself against personal liability from a personal injury at his residence.
The risk of falling on his home driveway was a personal risk. Mr. Tjas did not encounter this
risk "in connection with the performance of the work" he performed for AE Clevite. Rather,
he encountered the risk while performing a personal duty.
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The legal standard proposed by AE Clevite is consistent with prior Utah cases. For
example, in Hafer v. Industrial Commission. 526 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1974), the claimant was a
traveling salesman based in Salt Lake City for a supplier of machinery, auto parts, and
accessories. The claimant was furnished a company car and was reimbursed for all expenses
of its operation and maintenance. The claimant suffered a head injury while performing some
repairs on his automobile at a local service station. The evidence showed that the claimant's
assigned duties included keeping the car in a safe and efficient running condition. The court
affirmed the award of benefits, concluding that "in working on the car, [the claimant] was
performing duties arising out of or within the scope of his employment." IdL In contrast, Mr.
Tjas was not assigned or in any way encouraged by AE Clevite to maintain his home or his
driveway for business purposes since all face-to-face business contacts were made away from
his home.
Similarly, in Moser v. Industrial Commission. 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968), the claimant
was a truck driver who, upon completion of his assigned trip, took the company truck home
and parked it on a nearby lot. The next morning, when the claimant had difficulty in getting
the truck started, he phoned his manager who instructed him to check the truck ignition and
gas to try to correct the problem. In the course of carrying out these instructions, while
pouring gasoline in the carburetor, the gasoline spilled on the claimant, ignited, and burned the
claimant. The court awarded benefits to the claimant, concluding that the claimant's "duty to
drive the truck includes those things reasonably incidental to keeping it running and
driveable." IcL at 23. The court further found it significant that the claimant was acting at the
specific direction of his manger at the time of his injury. In the present case, AE Clevite
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never requested, directed, encouraged, or reasonably expected Mr. Tjas to salt his home
driveway for business purposes.
Mr. Tjas was not performing any service arising out of and in the course of his
employment at the time of his accident. Mr. Tjas was not engaged in an activity for the
benefit of his employer. The risk that caused the accident was a personal risk associated with
all homeowners who are concerned for individuals, such as mail carriers, who might enter
their property. This duty certainly was not created by Mr. Tjas' employment: during the
entire ten years that Mr. Tjas worked for AE Clevite, he had never had an appointment with a
client or supervisor at his home. (R. at 276, p. 48.) Rather, the duty to clear snow from a
sidewalk or driveway is a personal duty, mandated by an acknowledged city ordinance, which
applies to every citizen living in Salt Lake City.
The Labor Commission's award of benefits is based upon an extremely attenuated work
connection. Specifically, the Commission found that receiving mail at Mr. Tjas' home was
part of the employment relationship between AE Clevite and Mr. Tjas. (R. at 267.) The
Commission further concluded that salting his home driveway to make it safe for the delivery
of mail was "reasonably incidental" to the performance of AE Clevite's work. (R. at 267.)
While business mail was occasionally sent to Mr. Tjas' home, so was his personal mail. In
fact, Mr. Tjas did not receive the anticipated business package on the day of his injury.
Moreover, Mr. Tjas admitted that the package could have been sent by UPS, Federal Express,
or US Mail. Presumably, the business mail was sent to his home for his convenience (rather
than to a post office box). Even assuming a minor benefit to AE Clevite in this arrangement,
the risk of performing required home maintenance should not be shifted to the employer on the
basis of this minor, tangential benefit. AE Clevite would not have been liable for injuries
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suffered by Mr. Tjas' son if he had fallen while shoveling the driveway the morning of
January 13, 1997. Similarly, AE Clevite would not have had any liability to the mail carrier
had he slipped on the driveway on January 13, 1997. Only Mr. Tjas alone, as the
homeowner, carried this risk of liability.

C.

Mr. Tjas' Injury While Salting His Home Driveway Did Not
"Arise Out O f His Employment With AE Clevite.

The Utah Workers Compensation Act requires the claimant to demonstrate both that
his injury "arose out of" employment and "in the course of" employment. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-401 (1998). The two requirements are not synonymous and each must be met in order
for benefits to be awarded. BuczinskL 934 P.2d at 1172. An accident arises out of
employment "when there is a 'causal relationship' between the injury and the employment."
Commercial Carriers. 888 P.2d at 712. "Arising out of" does not mean that the accident must
be "'caused by' the employment; rather, the cause of the injury 'is something other than the
employment; the employment is thought of more as a condition out of which the event arises
than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion.'" IdL at 712 (quoting 1 Arthur
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 6.60, at 3-9 (1994)) (emphasis in quoted
treatise). This court has found that the "controlling test should be 'if the circumstances of the
employment can be fairly said to have elicited conduct by the employee which results in his
injury."' IcL. (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 11.11(c), at
3-205 (1994)).
In the present case, Mr. Tjas had no duty, obligation, or implied requirement from AE
Clevite to salt his driveway in order to accomplish his paperwork for AE Clevite at his home.
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Rather, the condition out of which the slip and fall arose was the duty of a homeowner to
maintain his premises. Mr. Tjas' employment with AE Clevite contributed no increase to the
risk which he already faced in having to perform this maintenance task as a home owner. The
possible receipt of a work-related package, in conjunction with the receipt of his personal
mail, did not create a condition of employment from which Mr. Tjas was subjected to the risk
associated with salting his home driveway. Instead, Mr. Tjas' conduct was prompted by his
long-held concern as the home owner that someone would slip on his driveway. This concern
had led him to salt his driveway for the last 30 years. Accordingly, Mr. Tjas' injuries from a
slip and fall accident on his home driveway cannot be found to have "arisen out of" his
employment with AE Clevite.

H.

A SURVEY OF THE STATUTES AND CASE LAW FROM OTHER
JURISDICTIONS REVEALS THAT THE LABOR COMMISSION'S ORDER IS
AN ABERRATION AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

In preparing this brief, Petitioners' counsel have researched the statutory provisions and
case law of all of the states of the United States. A summary of this survey is attached as
Exhibit "A" to the Addendum. This survey reveals that, while states may vary somewhat in
the details of their statutory provisions and issues which appellate courts have had an
opportunity to address, the basic principles of workers compensation law which have been
adopted by the Utah appellate courts (as discussed above) have been generally adopted. Only
a few states have had the opportunity to review a claim for an injury which has occurred at an
employee's home work site. The case law reveals, however, basic principles or analogous
situations which are useful in evaluating the claim presented by Mr. Tjas.
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Similar to Utah, almost every state has the same two-prong requirement that an
employee prove that his or her injuries "arose out of" and "in the course of" their employment.
Since the employer's work site has traditionally been the place of employment, the employer's
premises has been the generally accepted boundary for compensable injuries, unless the
employee demonstrates a strong work connection with his or her activities away from the
employer's work premises. Even when the employee is injured on the employer's work
premises, many states have required that the employee show that the injury resulted from a
risk directly related to the work.
Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court in Kennecott, many states have expressly
defined activities "incidental to employment" within the context of the "personal comfort"
doctrine. See Survey of Other Jurisdictions, attached hereto in the Addendum. These
activities are considered by the courts to be necessary to the comfort, convenience, and
welfare of the employee. The coverage for these incidental activities, however, has been
limited to the employer's premises or while the employee is traveling on the employer's
business. Ralph Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B.. 68 Ca. Rptr.2d 161 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1997).
The same incidental activity at home, with a minimal work relationship, is not compensable.
Id. For example, if an employee is injured while changing her clothes in the employer's
locker room prior commencing work, the injury may be compensable under the "personal
comfort"doctrine. In contrast, it is difficult to image any situation in which an injury to an
employee while dressing at home would be compensable.
When the employee is away from the employer's premises, the employee must
demonstrate that his activities were not merely of "incidental" benefit to his employer, but
were reasonably required by the employer as part of the employment. Moreover, when an
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employee does not have a set place or time of work, the work relationship to the activity that
he was engaged in at the time of the accident must be clear since the employer's control over
the employee is absent or minimal. See Survey of Other Jurisdictions, Exhibit "A."
A.

Case Law From Other Jurisdictions Supports A Denial Of
Benefits In This Case.

While this case represents a case of first impression in the State of Utah, courts in other
jurisdictions reviewing similar factual scenarios have denied compensation based upon a
finding that the injuries resulted from activities or risks which were not related to the
employee's work. For the Court's convenience, a copy of each case cited from other
jurisdictions is attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "D."
In Russellville Gas Company v. Duggar. 260 So.2d 393 (Ala. Civ. App. ), cert,
denied 260 So.2d 395 (Ala. 1971), the court declared that recognizing the home of an
employee as a work site does not transfer any risk of injury at home to the employer. In
Russellville, the employee was a petroleum gas truck driver who took the truck home with him
at night and on weekends and was required to respond to requests for delivery after working
hours. On Monday morning, while walking from his house to where the truck was parked in
the yard, the employee was injured when he slipped and fell on ice and snow on his driveway.
The lower court had concluded that the parking arrangement at the employee's home had made
the home the premises of the employer and consequently had awarded benefits. On appeal, the
court reversed this award. The court explained:

[T]o permit the home of appellee to be categorically designed as
the premises of [the employer] at all times when occupied by [the
employee] would, in effect provide protection of Workman's
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Compensation to [the employee] at all times without any means
of control of his activities by [the employer]. He could claim
compensation for falling in the bathtub. We do not think even
the benevolent purposes of Workmen's Compensation were
intended to be extended so far.

l± at 394.
The court further stated that if the employee had "been responding to a call to deliver
gas to a customer, or to a call from his employer directing performance of some service at the
time of his injury," they would have no difficulty placing him within the protection of the
workers compensation law. However, the fact that his employer provided a means of
transportation which might have been used to perform a service for his employer if called
during the weekend was found to be "merely incidental." IcL at 395.
Similarly, in Roberts v. Stell. 367 N.W.2d 198 (S.D. 1985), the claimant was a
resident motel manager. The claimed accident occurred on her day off when, while leaving to
go grocery shopping, she slipped and fell on the motel premises, fracturing her hip. The
claimant argued that since she was required to live on the premises and therefore eat her meals
there, "grocery shopping on her day off [was] 'naturally related or incidental' to her
employment and thus within the course of her employment." kL at 199-200. The court
rejected this argument, concluding that all persons gainfully employed are required to go
grocery shopping during their time off work. The court noted that while workers
compensation statutes are to be liberally construed, the compensation system "is not intended
to be health, accident, and old age insurance and spread general protection over risks common
to all and not arising out of and in the course of employment." IcL at 200 (emphasis in
original).
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In Glasser v. Youth Shop, 54 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1951), the claimant customarily took
store books home at night to make up his report. On the morning of his injury, the claimant
had spent about an hour working on the store records in an "office" adjoining his bedroom on
the second floor of his home. He was descending the stairs to have breakfast before leaving
for the store, carrying his daily record book and some other work-related papers, when he
slipped and fell, sustaining a fractured shoulder and other injuries. The court observed that
since an employer carries the burden of liability in workers compensation, "there must then
be some causal connection between the employment and the injury, or it must have had
its origin in some risk incident to or connected with the employment, or have followed
from it as a natural consequence." IcL at 687 (emphasis supplied). "While there is a
presumption that the claim comes within the provisions of the Act, the claimant is not relieved
of the burden of proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment." KL
The court affirmed the denial of benefits, finding "[t]he appellant was not on the stairs because
of his employment; he would have been there in any event, regardless of whether he had
brought his work home from the store." IcL (emphasis supplied).
Similarly, Mr. Tjas would have been salting his driveway in any event, regardless of
whether the mail carrier was bringing him a work-related package. As in Glasser. Mr. Tjas
was not salting his driveway because of his employment, and the risk that he faced in salting
the driveway was not causally related to his work. Furthermore, although the claimant in
Glasser was carrying work records when he fell on the stairs, this minimal work-relationship
was found to be an inadequate basis upon which to award compensation.
In Lovd v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 280 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955), the claimant was employed by a funeral home as an embalmer who, on the date of his
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injury, was on vacation at home, but was subject to call at any time. The claimant was
standing on a ladder painting the side of his house when he heard his telephone ring. He
started down the ladder with his paint and brush when the foot of the ladder slipped, causing
him to fall to the ground, breaking his leg. He never answered the telephone and there was no
evidence as to who was calling him. He alleged, however, that as part of his employment he
was going to answer the telephone because he was subject to call at any time. The court
affirmed the denial of benefits, concluding:

. . . the evidence wholly fails to show that on the occasion of
appellant's injury he was doing anything in furtherance of his
employer's business. . . . It is true that he was injured while
getting down from the ladder to answer the telephone, but there
is no evidence in the record that he ever answered it or that any
one answered it for him, nor is there any evidence that the call
was from his employer. The call could have been from some
friend or a member of his family, or even a "wrong number."

ld^at955.
Similarly, in the present case, Petitioner was engaged in an activity which was
primarily, if not exclusively, personal in nature at the time of his injury. Mr. Tjas admitted
that, although he was expecting a package for an upcoming business trip, he did not know
whether the package would be sent by UPS, Federal Express, or by U.S. Mail. (R. at 276, p.
50.) Mr. Tjas had no idea how the package in question had been sent. (R. at 276, p. 50.)
Moreover, Petitioner testified that when he went out to salt his driveway, it made no
difference whether he received a business package or not — his intent was to make the
driveway safer for the mail carrier because "for years [he'd] worried about that driveway and
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someone falling on it. And that's why [he] got the salt." (R. at 276, p. 58.) In fact, the
package did not arrive until Tuesday, January 14, 1997. (R. at 276, p. 64.)
In Danielsen v. Security Van Lines, Inc., 158. So.2d 609 (La. 1963), the claimant was
a salesman-estimator whose duties required that he travel to the premises of prospective
customers and prepare estimates of the charges for moving or storing household effects. The
claimant had no fixed working hours and arranged his own work schedule. The claimant's
employer supplied an automobile for use in his work which the claimant kept in a garage
located one-half block from his residence. On the day of his injury, the claimant reviewed his
route for the day, placed the memoranda in his pocket, and descended a flight of steps leading
from his apartment. He carried a small sheaf of rate schedules and a bag of garbage that he
intended to place in a garbage can on his way to the garage. He fell on the steps, sustaining a
broken hip which he alleged caused permanent and total disability. The court denied benefits,
concluding as follows:

We observe that the plaintiff fell on the steps of his residence.
At the time, he was carrying a sack of garbage, which he
intended to deposit in the garbage can. He had not reached the
garage, where the company automobile was kept. The time of
the accident did not fall within fixed work hours, for the plaintiff
had none. Neither can we reasonably say that the accident
occurred while he was engaged in the performance of his duties.
In our opinion, the circumstances demonstrate that he had not as
yet crossed the boundary of his employment.

Id, at 611.
In the present case, Mr. Tjas had completed his work for the day and was not engaged
in any substantial work-related activity at the time of his accident. Specifically, he had
returned to his home from his business visits and had changed out of his business clothes. (R.
-38-

at 276, pp. 41, 60.) He had finished loading his car with items for his upcoming business trip
and had returned inside the house. (R. at 276, pp. 37-38.) Through the window of his home,
Mr. Tjas happened to see the mail carrier approaching his house, spontaneously deciding to go
outside to salt the driveway. (R. at 276, pp. 28, 39, 42.) Mr. Tjas had salted his driveway on
numerous previous occasions over the years (having lived in this same house since 1965). His
50-lb. bag of salt was nearly empty from prior use. For years he had worried that someone
might slip on his admittedly steep and dangerous driveway ~ the same risk and concern shared
by every homeowner in Salt lake City. Mr. Tjas candidly admits that he would have salted his
driveway on January 13, 1997 whether he was going to receive a business package or not. His
intent, therefore, with salting the driveway on January 13, 1997 was to perform a service for
himself as a homeowner, not as a business-related function. The mere possibility that the mail
carrier may have been bringing Mr. Tjas a work-related package that day did not transform his
purely personal activity into a work-related risk of his employment. See Loyd, supra.

B.

Having A Den At Home For "Office Work" Does Not Transform Routine
Homeowner Responsibilities Into Work Activities.

The duty to complete paperwork for AE Clevite on Fridays in a den at his home
cannot reasonably be extrapolated to impose a duty upon Mr. Tjas to perform maintenance
tasks on his home and yard for the benefit of AE Clevite. In Rowan v. University of
Nebraska. 299 N.W.2d 774, 775-776 (Neb. 1980), the Supreme Court of Nebraska declared
that "[t]he essential inquiry is whether the plaintiff was injured as a result of a risk connected
with the employment." The court denied benefits to a university professor who was injured
while working in a private studio. The claimant was standing on a ladder attempting to open a
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window when the window came loose causing him to fall to the floor. The court concluded,
"[t]he plaintiff in this case was not at a place where his service required him to be at the time
he was injured. The defendant was not required to assume the risk incidental to the defective
window in the private studio. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding that the
accident did not arise out of or in the course of the plaintiff's employment by the defendant."
Id,
In Brvan v. First Free Will Baptist Church. 147 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1966), a minister
injured his back while moving his stove from the church's parsonage where the minister
resided. The minister had agreed to move out of the parsonage so that repairs could be made
prior to the arrival of a new minister. While the church received some benefit from the
minister's actions, the court concluded that the injury was nevertheless not compensable as it
was a personal act. The court explained:

[Although the moving of the stove from the parsonage was for
his employer's benefit and although he was still minister and on
the payroll of his employer his injury arose out of his
performing an act personal to himself and his family in
moving the stove to his new church, probably its parsonage, and
it was not connected with his employment.

Id. at 637 (emphasis supplied). The court declared the following underlying policy
consideration as a part of its evaluation: "The rule of causal relation is 'the very sheet anchor
of the Workmen's Compensation Act,' and has been adhered to in our decisions and prevents
our Act from being a general health and insurance benefit act." kL at 635. (emphasis
supplied).
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The court in Bryan quoted from a similar case from New Jersey, wherein a minister
had injured his back while taking a barrel of ashes out of the cellar of the parsonage. Van
Devander v. West Side M.E. Church, 160 A. 763 ( N.J. 1932). In Van Devander, the court
explained, "Petitioner was performing a household duty for his own benefit which he would
be required to perform if he lived in a house owned by himself." kL

The court found that

"carrying ashes is certainly not incidental to [the office of minister], directly or indirectly,"
id., concluding that, at the time the accident occurred, the claimant was "performing an act
personal to himself and his family and not connected with his employment as a minister." kL
Similarly, in the present case, Mr. Tjas was not required, either expressly or impliedly,
to maintain his home for business purposes. Accordingly, activities related to the maintenance
of his home can not be considered "incidental" to his employment with AE Clevite, nor can
the injuries which he sustained while performing the duty of a homeowner be considered to
have arisen "in the course of" his employment with AE Clevite.
In Former v. J.K. Holding Co.. 349 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), the claimant
fell while hanging plants on her home porch. The claimant was the sole employee at the
Statesville, N.C. office. She performed bookkeeping and secretarial work, but also performed
other tasks, including personal errands for the boss, cleaning the office, disposing of trash and
tending to various decorative plants kept in the office. When the company decided to close the
Statesville office, the boss asked the claimant to dispose of the office plants. While he did not
know what she would do with them, he knew it was likely that she would take them home.
On the day of the accident, the claimant left work in the mid afternoon to go to her home to
hang the plants. She slipped and fell off of a chair in her home while trying to hang the
plants, suffering several injuries. In denying her claim, the court found that the incidental
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benefit accruing to the employer was not so appreciable as to render the claimant's activities
sufficiently work-related to justify compensation. IdL at 298. The court further found that the
risk of injury was not one which was incidental or inherent to her employment. kL Rather,
the act of hanging the plants was clearly an act undertaken for her own benefit and "not for the
benefit of her employer to any appreciable extent." kL (quotation omitted).
In contrast is the Colorado case of Brogger v. Kezer, 626 P.2d 700 (Colo. Ct. App.
1980). In Brogger, the claimant and her husband were the principal officers of a corporation
which did engineering work. The company office was in their home. Part of the mortgage
payment on the home was paid by the corporation, and part was paid by the claimant and her
husband personally. They had maintained their offices at different locations over the years,
and the claimant's responsibilities had always included various maintenance jobs, including
painting, varnishing, and cleaning, in addition to her secretarial duties. Notably, the claimant
and her husband entertained clients at the home. The court concluded that the claimant's
injuries from a fall off of a ladder while painting the home were compensable. The court
specifically found that the facts demonstrated that "the maintenance of the home which served
as the company office and was used for entertaining customers was a necessary facet of the
employer's business." kL at 702 (emphasis supplied).
In the present case, AE Clevite customers and company representatives never came to
Mr. Tjas' home. Consequently, the maintenance of Mr. Tjas home was not a necessary facet
of his employment with AE Clevite. AE Clevite never requested, instructed, or implied that
Mr. Tjas was to maintain his home or yard in any way as a part of his job duties with AE
Clevite. Rather, the only portion of the home which was used for business was Mr. Tjas' den,
and the den was only used for paper work and phone calls. The mail carrier did not come to
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Mr. Tjas home solely to deliver work materials. Rather, the mail carrier had come to Mr.
Tjas' home for the last 30 years to deliver Mr. Tjas' personal mail. Intermittent delivery of a
work-related item did not necessitate the mail carrier's presence at Mr. Tjas' home, but was
merely incidental to the delivery of Mr. Tjas' personal mail.
Finally, an alleged benefit to the employer must be substantial in order to shift the risk
of injury. In Ouaglino v. Ace Bakery Division, of Lakeland Bakery. Inc.. 275 So.2d 874(La.
Ct. App. 1973), the decedent's wife brought an action for death benefits. The decedent had
worked as a bakery manager for the last 23 years for the employer. On the day of the
accident, he had brought home a blower from the bakery, the type used to blow flour from
crevices and cracks from the machinery. The intent of the decedent was to test the blower at
his home. He was electrocuted while using the blower to blow grass clippings off his
driveway. The wife testified that as she observed him blowing the grass, he had said "I'm
killing two birds with one stone, I'm testing," or other words to that effect. The wife argued
that the death of her husband occurred while he was testing the blower for the benefit of his
employer, even though he may also have been engaged in the personal business of blowing the
grass from his driveway. IcL at 876. The standard that the Louisiana court applied is as
follows: "(1) was the employee then engaged about his employer's business or merely pursing
his own business or pleasure; (2) did the necessities of that employer's business reasonably
require the employee be at the place of the accident at the time the accident occurred?" IcL
The court found that there was no evidence to show that his activity at the time of the accident
was reasonably required in or to accomplish his work. Id,
In the present case, while Mr. Tjas' action of salting his personal driveway may have
had a minor concurrent business purpose, there was no evidence to show that his employment
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reasonably required him to salt his driveway. His work required him to visit clients away
from his home and to perform paper work while at his home. Similar to Guaglino, the clearly
predominant purpose of Mr. Tjas' activity of salting the driveway was personal.
C.

Home Activities Which Merely Prepare An Employee For Work Are Not
Compensable If Any Injury Results From The Activity.

In further defining the scope of compensable injuries which occur at an employee's
home, courts have ruled that activities which are merely preparatory to engaging in a work
activity are not within the course and scope of employment. In Owen v. Chrysler
Corporation. 371 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1985), the decedent was required to travel as a part of
his employment. On the day of his fatal heart attack, the decedent was scheduled to take a
business trip, and the weather presented blizzard-like conditions. The decedent went outside to
move his car into the garage in order to load his suitcase. Before he could move the car,
however, he had to move the family truck which was parked in front of the car. The truck
was stuck in a snowbank, and the decedent and his wife shoveled out the snow and attempted
to push the truck. The decedent suffered an acute myocardial infarction, and he died as a
result of shoveling the snow. Although the decedent had a history of heart problems, the
medical evidence showed that the exertion that morning had contributed to the decedent's heart
attack. The court reversed the commission's award of benefits, concluding that although

[t]he factors considered in deciding if the preparatory acts fall
within the scope of a special mission should be viewed liberally
in light of the remedial nature of the workers' compensation
scheme. . . . moving the car into the garage for purposes of
placing a suitcase in the car was at most preparation for the
eventuality of travel. The activity was not within the scope of the
special mission so as to support an award of compensation.
-44-

IdL at 521.

There are numerous activities and risks which, although preparatory for work, would
not be considered compensable. For example, a businessman begins his day by shaving to
present an appropriate appearance at a meeting with a client. If, by chance, he happens to cut
himself and bleed to death because he is a hemophiliac, the claim would not be compensable
since the risk of shaving is not a risk of employment. Shaving is, rather, an act preparatory to
employment. Similarly, employees who may have a home satellite office would not generally
be viewed as furthering the interests of their employer when they are engaged in home duties
such as dressing for the day, taking out the garbage, preparing a meal, taking a shower, or
shoveling the walk. The risks associated with these activities are not created by work ~ they
are the everyday risks of a homeowner. In fact, the duty to keep a homeowner's walks free of
snow and ice is a legal responsibility placed upon Mr. Tjas (and all citizens) by local
ordinance. See Salt Lake City, UT., Ordinances 14.20.070 (all hail, snow, or sleet to be
removed from sidewalks within 24 hours).

CONCLUSION

This Court should find that the Labor Commission abused its discretion in concluding
that Mr. Tjas' activity of salting his personal driveway was "reasonably incidental" to his
employment with AE Clevite. Traditional principles of Utah law have established that injuries
which occur while away from an employer-controlled premises are presumed not to be in the
course of employment unless there is a clear work relationship and benefit to the employer.
The Court should require that when an injury occurs at a home work site, the employee must
demonstrate that the injury occurred during the actual performance of the work required by the
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employer. An "incidental" work relationship should be rejected as an insufficient basis upon
which liability for personal risks may be shifted to the employer. The Court should reverse
the Labor Commission's order and find Mr. Tjas' claim non-compensable on the basis that his
injuries did not "arise out of and in the course of" his employment with AE Clevite.
DATED this 6th day of July, 1999.
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